In other words, corporations have now succeeded in getting themselves "regulated" by a set of laws and rules that effectively paralyze government regulators. Regulation of chemicals has effectively ended. The regulatory system now regulates not industry but environmentalists, in the sense that it narrowly defines and restricts the responses that they can make to corporate harms. By channeling environmentalist responses into industry-defined activities, the regulatory system makes environmentalists entirely predictable and therefore manageable.

But all is not lost. Industry's strategy for ending government regulation has an Achilles' heel. The whole strategy rests on the assumption that, when the science is uncertain, we should proceed with "business as usual" until harm can be proven to a scientific certainty. The precautionary principle turns this assumption on its head, saying, "When the science is uncertain, but there is evidence of harm, we have a duty to take precautionary action to prevent harm." If the precautionary principle were adopted, industry's elaborate strategy for paralyzing government would crumble.

Could this be why the chemical industry and the Bush administration have mounted a coordinated campaign to discredit, demonize, and derail the precautionary principle? You think?

Writing the precautionary principle into local laws -- and perhaps more importantly into corporate charters -- would fundamentally change the balance of power between people and money. What a worthy fight this is!

Today’s withdrawal of a rulemaking initiated to protect health care workers from accidental needle sticks shows a profound indifference to the safety of workers and is yet another example of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) failure to do its job.

In 2000, Public Citizen and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) petitioned the FDA to ban a variety of unsafe devices used by health care workers, including certain intravenous (IV) catheters, blood collection devices, blood collection needle sets (“butterfly syringes”), glass capillary tubes and IV infusion equipment. The problem is significant: Each year, U.S. health care workers sustain 590,000 needle sticks, according to the University of Virginia, and thousands have contracted HIV and hepatitis B or C after being accidentally stuck by infected needles while on the job. Many have died. These deaths and injuries were unnecessary because devices that are equally effective, yet have safety features such as retractable needles, self-blunting needles and protective shields, exist.

In response to the petition, the FDA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, in which the agency acknowledged the dangers associated with needles and began the process of addressing them. Now, the agency has retreated in the face of industry pressure. The agency claims that not enough detailed data exist to warrant action. However, an extensive body of research documents the ability of the safer devices to reduce needle sticks. As the American Medical Association concluded in 2001, “Scientific data now indicate that the appropriate use of needlestick prevention devices, especially in comprehensive prevention programs, significantly reduces the incidence of needlestick injuries.”

The FDA has increasingly come under fire for its refusal to ensure that prescription drugs are safe before being placed on the market. In most cases where unsafe drugs have had to be removed from the market, safer, equally effective alternatives have existed. Here, again, the agency is eschewing its responsibility to ensure the safety of the products it regulates. By allowing considerably more dangerous devices to stay on the market when equally effective, safer alternatives are available, the FDA has endangered the lives of hundreds of thousands of health care workers in this country.

More than half of Americans now say it is more important for the president to focus on domestic policy — the first time since Sept. 11, 2001 that domestic matters have been viewed as a higher priority than the war on terrorism in polling by the Pew Research Center.

Two-thirds said the president could have done more to get relief efforts going quickly, according to the survey.

The slow-moving response to the hurricane appears to have shaken American confidence in the government's ability to deal with a major disaster. Four in 10 said the response to the hurricane has made them less confident about the government's ability to handle a major terrorist attack.

Almost six in 10 in the Pew poll, 58%, say they have felt depressed because of what's happened along the Gulf Coast. Pew polling indicates that at no point during the Iraq war has that high a percentage of people said they were depressed because of the war.

First, a recap of PART itself: PART is supposed to be a tool for performance measurement that, theoretically, generates data on program effectiveness that can then be fed back into program management reforms and budget decisions. In actuality, PART is a simplistic one-size-fits-all process that provides a technical veneer for very political decisions. In addition to creating fine-sounding rhetorics of results to justify slash-and-burn budget decisions, PART is a vehicle for sending signals to program managers to make policy adjustments that receive the White House seal of approval (whether or not those decisions are actually authorized by the law governing a program). Learn more with this introductory issue brief.

Check out the FY05 and FY06 PART assessments for the Army Corps of Engineers. Relevant programs PARTed:

• Coastal Storm Damage Reduction Program: praised for using cost-benefit analysis in prioritizing construction projects. As John Woodley, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works testified, the Corps “had numerous projects ongoing and insufficient funding to continue all of our projects at an efficient level” [in other words, too little funding to meet all the pressing needs] and therefore asked for construction funds “to be strictly prioritized by remaining cost to remaining benefit, and that is a measure that takes into account the benefits that are yet to be gained from a project compared to the remaining costs that are needed to be invested to reap those benefits.” [Testimony available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 82731 (F.D.C.H.).] We need more details about these cost-benefit analyses — after all, as one TV commentator has observed, “"If this [level of disaster] were to happen in California, okay, fine. There's a number of incentives to sort of rebuild that area. Imagine trying to do that in rural Mississippi.” Or in any other poor area where the benefits of damage reduction could count for less than damage reduction in a more prized coastal area. The program was rated as “Results Not Demonstrated” — a grade that OMB explains officially as an indeterminate score, meaning that there is insufficient information upon which to assess program results, but that the White House often invokes as meaning failure to produce results. The program was slated for successive budget cuts in the FY04, 05, and 06 budgets.
• Emergency Management Program: The White House knew that the program was underfunded and relied excessively on supplemental funding, which forced the Corps to redirect funds from other projects until supplemental funds came through. Just the same, the White House asked for a dramatic budget cut for FY06.
• Flood Damage Reduction Program: rated “Results Not Demonstrated.” One place the program lost points on its PART assessment was the question, “Is the program optimally designed to address the interest, problem or need?” OMB’s response: no, because — based on the OMB bean counter’s opinion, not any real evidence — the Corps “should put more emphasis on non-structural solutions and avoid designing projects to provide 100-year protection where it may not be economically feasible.” Another “failure”: “When formulating proposed investments, the Corps assumes schedules that do not reflect likely funding constraints. On the bright side, the budget examiner noted, “Recently, the Corps has adopted a performance measure where it compares the estimated costs of completed projects with the projected benefits to ensure that the project’s benefit cost ratio is maintained.”

• Although the share of foreign-born employment increased by 22 percent between 1996 and 2000, the share of fatal occupational injuries for this population increased by 43 percent.

• Fatal work injuries in six states accounted for 64 percent of all fatalities for foreign-born workers between 1996 and 2001: California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Texas.

• Nearly one in four fatally injured foreign-born workers was employed in the construction industry.

• Less than one-third of the costs of occupational illnesses and injuries are paid for by employer-funded workers’ compensation—with taxpayers picking up nearly 20 percent of the tab through Medicaid and Medicare. Injured workers and their families pay the largest share.

Check it out: Immigrant Workers at Risk: The Urgent Need for Improved Workplace Safety and Health Policies and Programs

Posted by Robert Shull, 12:53:34 PM