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Friday, September 02, 2005

PART of the Problem in New Orleans

First, a recap of PART itself: PART is supposed to be a tool for performance measurement that, theoretically, generates data on program effectiveness that can then be fed back into program management reforms and budget decisions. In actuality, PART is a simplistic one-size-fits-all process that provides a technical veneer for very political decisions. In addition to creating fine-sounding rhetorics of results to justify slash-and-burn budget decisions, PART is a vehicle for sending signals to program managers to make policy adjustments that receive the White House seal of approval (whether or not those decisions are actually authorized by the law governing a program). Learn more with this introductory issue brief.

Check out the FY05 and FY06 PART assessments for the Army Corps of Engineers. Relevant programs PARTed:

• Coastal Storm Damage Reduction Program: praised for using cost-benefit analysis in prioritizing construction projects. As John Woodley, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works testified, the Corps “had numerous projects ongoing and insufficient funding to continue all of our projects at an efficient level” [in other words, too little funding to meet all the pressing needs] and therefore asked for construction funds “to be strictly prioritized by remaining cost to remaining benefit, and that is a measure that takes into account the benefits that are yet to be gained from a project compared to the remaining costs that are needed to be invested to reap those benefits.” [Testimony available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 82731 (F.D.C.H.).] We need more details about these cost-benefit analyses — after all, as one TV commentator has observed, “"If this [level of disaster] were to happen in California, okay, fine. There's a number of incentives to sort of rebuild that area. Imagine trying to do that in rural Mississippi.” Or in any other poor area where the benefits of damage reduction could count for less than damage reduction in a more prized coastal area. The program was rated as “Results Not Demonstrated” — a grade that OMB explains officially as an indeterminate score, meaning that there is insufficient information upon which to assess program results, but that the White House often invokes as meaning failure to produce results. The program was slated for successive budget cuts in the FY04, 05, and 06 budgets.
• Emergency Management Program: The White House knew that the program was underfunded and relied excessively on supplemental funding, which forced the Corps to redirect funds from other projects until supplemental funds came through. Just the same, the White House asked for a dramatic budget cut for FY06.
• Flood Damage Reduction Program: rated “Results Not Demonstrated.” One place the program lost points on its PART assessment was the question, “Is the program optimally designed to address the interest, problem or need?” OMB’s response: no, because — based on the OMB bean counter’s opinion, not any real evidence — the Corps “should put more emphasis on non-structural solutions and avoid designing projects to provide 100-year protection where it may not be economically feasible.” Another “failure”: “When formulating proposed investments, the Corps assumes schedules that do not reflect likely funding constraints. On the bright side, the budget examiner noted, “Recently, the Corps has adopted a performance measure where it compares the estimated costs of completed projects with the projected benefits to ensure that the project’s benefit cost ratio is maintained.”