Chemical (In)security - Public Health - RegWatch

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Monday, March 27, 2006

Chemical (In)security

Despite the security rhetoric pushed by the administration since 9/11, our rail systems, which transport 1,7 million shipments of hazardous materials each year, remain dangerously vulnerable to a terrorist attack, according to the New York Times.

Since 9/11, railroads have spent millions to install fences and security cameras and add additional officers around the state, but industry officials concede that their facilities are far too large to be completely sealed. Leaders of railroad workers' unions say it is not uncommon for tanker cars to be left unattended for days, and that security along the rails is frighteningly inadequate. And the sight of graffiti-covered tank cars filled with deadly gases is a reminder of the holes in the security system.
State and local officials say they are limited in what they can do to regulate the thousands of tank cars of deadly gases hauled around New Jersey each year. In other cities and states, proposals to reroute dangerous chemicals away from major population centers, most notably in Washington, D.C., have faced fierce opposition and legal challenges from both the railroads and local communities where the chemicals would be rerouted. The courts have also upheld the railroads' assertion that only the federal government can regulate rail traffic.

Moreover, the toxic cargo transported by railroads means an attack could be devastating; a Navy study cited in the article predicts that a single car of chlorine near a densely populated area could kill as many as 100,000 people.”

Just as troubling, a drill conducted last year by the U.S. government and involving hundreds of public officials and private corporations revealed major flaws in communication and preparedness. According to the New Jersey Media Group:

"It was a testament to how unprepared people really are," said Wilmer Alvarez, a director at Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness. "The mistakes that occurred caused almost a complete shutdown of the public health system. They tested the public health system and it got ransacked."
As the one-year anniversary of the drill -- known as TopOff3 -- approaches, neither the state nor federal government has issued final reports detailing the problems -- or successes -- of the terror simulation. But interviews with government officials and expert observers in recent weeks have drawn parallels to the much-maligned federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

Despite this disturbing evidence that we are woefully unprepared should another attack occur, DHS has made little progress on chemical security, according to a recent GAO report.